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The Dynamical Renaissance in Neuroscience 
Abstract 
Although there is a substantial philosophical literature on dynamical systems theory in the 
cognitive sciences, the same is not the case for neuroscience. This paper attempts to motivate 
increased discussion via a set of overlapping issues. The first aim is primarily historical and is to 
demonstrate that dynamical systems theory is currently experiencing a renaissance in 
neuroscience. Although dynamical concepts and methods are becoming increasingly popular in 
contemporary neuroscience, the general approach should not be viewed as something entirely 
new to neuroscience. Instead, it is more appropriate to view the current developments as making 
central again approaches that facilitated some of neuroscience’s most significant early 
achievements, namely, the Hodgkin-Huxley and FitzHugh-Nagumo models. The second aim is 
primarily critical and defends a version of the “dynamical hypothesis” in neuroscience. Whereas 
the original version centered on defending a noncomputational and nonrepresentational account 
of cognition, the version I have in mind is broader and includes both cognition and the neural 
systems that realize it as well. In view of that, I discuss research on motor control as a 
paradigmatic example demonstrating that the concepts and methods of dynamical systems theory 
are increasingly and successfully being applied to neural systems in contemporary neuroscience. 
More significantly, such applications are motivating a stronger metaphysical claim, that is, 
understanding neural systems as being dynamical systems, which includes not requiring appeal to 
representations to explain or understand those phenomena. Taken together, the historical claim 
and the critical claim demonstrate that the dynamical hypothesis is undergoing a renaissance in 
contemporary neuroscience. 
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1. Introduction 
Throughout the mid-twentieth century, many areas of psychology underwent a “cognitive 
revolution” (Bechtel & Graham, 1999; Thagard, 2005). This revolution drove an information-
processing perspective of mind (Stillings, Weisler, Chase, Feinstein, Garfield, & Rissland, 1995), 
namely, mental activity like decision-making and problem solving, as well as goal-directed 
behavior. This perspective centered on explaining mind in terms of representations that encoded 
and decoded information and the computational procedures that acted on them (Thagard, 2019; 
Von Eckardt, 1995). During that time, the neurosciences were primarily concerned with behavior 
and physiology (Cooper & Shallice, 2010). Accordingly, conceptual tools gaining traction in 
cognitive science (e.g., computation and representation) were largely not employed. On the other 
hand, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, research in cognitive science centered more on 
neurobiologically-inspired accounts of cognition, especially artificial neural networks like 
connectionism (Cooper & Shallice, 2010; Rumelhart, 1989). Even though neurobiologically-
inspired concepts and models gained prominence, the information-processing perspective 
remained and cognition was defined in terms of computations and representations (Boden, 2006). 
The widespread application of such information-processing conceptions of mind presumably left 
many in agreement with Fodor (1975) in thinking that computational and representational 
approaches were “the only game in town” (Rescorla, 2020). 
This overview is, of course, quite simplistic and leaves out significant facts. For example, 
various mind sciences—broadly construed—were not impacted by the cognitive revolution and 
its information-processing perspective. Ecological psychology (Gibson, 1979/1986), 
embodiment (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1991), and synergetics (Haken, Kelso, & Bunz, 
1985), to name a few, carried out rich research programs without appeal to concepts such as 
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“computation” or “representation” in their accounts of mental activity or goal-directed behavior. 
Many of these research programs did not just adhere to different concepts, methods, and theories, 
but were also staunchly opposed to understanding the mind in computational or representational 
terms. Yet, proponents of information-processing accounts were left asking, “If mind is not 
computational or representational, then what is it?” Throughout the 1990s, van Gelder (1995) 
and others published a number of works answering just that question: Mind is best understood 
not in computational or representational terms, but in terms of dynamical systems theory. The 
claim that mind is fundamentally dynamic in nature captured what was at the heart of a variety of 
noninformation-processing accounts of mind. The concepts and methods of dynamical systems 
theory are regularly central to research by ecological psychologists (Chemero, 2009), proponents 
of embodiment and enactivism (Thompson, 2007), and work in coordination dynamics and 
synergetics (Kelso, 2009). What about dynamical systems theory in neuroscience; does it provide 
a viable investigative framework? Answering that question is the primary purpose of this paper. 
I have two aims here: The first aim is primarily historical and is to demonstrate that 
dynamical systems theory is currently experiencing a renaissance in neuroscience. Although 
dynamical concepts and methods are becoming increasingly popular in contemporary 
neuroscience, the general approach should not be viewed as something entirely new to 
neuroscience. Instead, it is more appropriate to view the current developments as making central 
again approaches that facilitated some of neuroscience’s most significant early achievements 
during the mid-twentieth century. The second aim is primarily critical and defends a version of 
the “dynamical hypothesis” in neuroscience. Whereas the original version centered on defending, 
among other things, nonrepresentational accounts of cognition, the version I have in mind is 
broader and includes the substrates of cognitive systems as well. In view of that, I discuss 
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research on motor control as a paradigmatic example that demonstrates that the concepts and 
methods of dynamical systems theory are increasingly and successfully being applied to a wide 
range of neural systems in neuroscience. More significantly, such applications are motivating a 
stronger metaphysical claim, that is, understanding neural systems as being dynamical systems, 
which includes not requiring appeal to representations to explain or understand those 
phenomena. 
In the next section, I focus on the first aim and describe the dynamical renaissance. 
There, I introduce dynamical systems theory and dimensionality reduction. I highlight the 
significant role the latter has come to play in dynamical accounts of neural phenomena, with an 
emphasis on two historical examples of its application: the Hodgkin-Huxley and FitzHugh-
Nagumo models. In the section that follows, I focus on the second aim, and present 
representational and dynamical systems explanations of motor control in order to demonstrate 
how the dynamical renaissance is motivating a reexamination of the necessity of appealing to 
“representations” in explanations of neural phenomena. 
 
2. The dynamical renaissance 
A “renaissance” can be defined as “a situation when there is new interest in something 
and it becomes strong and active again” (Combley, 2011). This term is an appropriate description 
of what is happening in neuroscience because although the concepts and methods of dynamical 
systems theory can be viewed as novel in many contemporary subdisciplines of neuroscience, the 
fact is that the general approach was employed in research on a number of the field’s 
foundational discoveries in the mid-twentieth century. The claim here is not that dynamical 
systems theory, broadly construed, has been absent from all neuroscience practice during those 
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intervening years. It is clear that some dynamical tools—especially differential equations—have 
been standardly applied in neuroscience research for decades.1 Much of this work employs 
dynamical tools in order to model the electrophysiological properties of neurons, particularly 
those concerning neuronal circuits and synaptic organization (Izhikevich, 2007, pp. xv-xvi). 
Consequently, the dynamic properties of neural systems have not on their own been central 
topics of investigation. Thus, dynamical systems theory concepts such as “fixed point attractors,” 
“limit cycles,” and “phase transitions,” as well as particular methods for analyzing and 
describing those properties, have not been regularly employed. It is those features and methods 
that make dynamical systems theory uniquely qualified for investigating the dynamics—
especially nonlinear dynamics—of biological systems like neurons and neuronal networks. Thus, 
historically speaking, when dynamical systems theory has been seen in neuroscience, it has 
commonly been in the service of investigating neurophysiology and organization.2 Moreover, 
 
1 With that said, terms like “dynamic(s)” and “dynamical(ly)” seldom appear in the philosophy 
of neuroscience literature. The following is far from a literature review, but is intended to 
provide illustrative examples: Bickle, Mandik, and Landreth (2019) mention “dynamical” 11 
times, but primarily in terms of nonmechanistic and nonreductionistic approaches falling short of 
providing viable alternatives or explanations; Patricia Churchland (2002) mentions “dynamics” 
and “dynamical(ly)” about 20 times, but usually in ways that deprioritize it, such as “the 
dynamics … will be set aside here” (p. 78), “the metaphor of dynamical systems” (p. 112), and 
that dynamical systems theory will likely augment but not replace information-processing 
approaches (p. 274); and Craver mentions “dynamically” once (2007, p. 4; though 
“hemodynamics” is mentioned on two pages). 
 
2 As Eugene Izhikevich, one of the pioneers in contemporary applications of dynamical systems 
theory in neuroscience, has pointed out, 
Nonlinear dynamical system theory is a core of computational neuroscience 
research, but it is not a standard part of the graduate neuroscience curriculum. … 
As a result, many neuroscientists fail to grasp such fundamental concepts as 
equilibrium, stability, limit cycle attractor, and bifurcations, even though 
neuroscientists constantly encounter these nonlinear phenomena. (Izhikevich, 
2007, p. xvi) 
A brief review of the “Top 10 Global Universities for Neuroscience” in 2020 
<www.usnews.com/education/best-global-universities/slideshows/see-the-top-10-global-
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such research has been informed by information-processing views of neuronal activity and 
organization, including single neurons (e.g., Koch, 1999) and populations of neurons (e.g., 
Schöner, Spencer, & the DFT Research Group, 2016). Such claims draw attention to a number of 
controversial issues recognizable by those familiar with particular debates in the cognitive 
sciences and philosophy of mind.3 One debate concerns the fact that many proponents of 
dynamical systems theory in the cognitive sciences have not only supported use of its concepts 
and methods, but they have also championed a controversial position regarding the nature of 
cognition: the dynamical hypothesis. 
In the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind, the dynamical hypothesis centers on 
two claims (Port & van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder, 1998). First, is the knowledge hypothesis, 
 
universities-for-neuroscience-and-behavior> offers support to Izhikevich’s claim that dynamical 
systems theory—both linear and nonlinear—is mostly absent from neuroscience curriculums. 
For example, Stanford University has one week on dynamical systems in one class; Washington 
University in St. Louis has nothing explicitly on dynamical systems in its core courses (but 
maybe in an elective); University of Oxford has nothing explicitly on dynamical systems; and 
even Carnegie Mellon University’s joint Ph.D. program in neuroscience and statistics has only 
one course on time series analysis, and it is unclear if it covers nonlinear phenomena. 
 
3 The “philosophy of neuroscience” is intentionally not mentioned here because the majority of 
the relevant philosophical literature on dynamical systems theory has focused on topics typically 
treated as being in the purview of the cognitive sciences (that is, construed such that 
neuroscience is not the central or dominant contributing discipline) and philosophy of mind. 
Even when neuroscience is mentioned, it is usually confined to intersections with the cognitive 
sciences and philosophy of mind. For example, in a review of contemporary issues in the 
philosophy of neuroscience, Bickle and Hardcastle (2012) discuss issues of dynamical versus 
mechanistic explanations, but refer to cognitive science literature. In another example, Eliasmith 
(2010) mentions that dynamical systems theory can be utilized to illuminate how the brain 
implements computations, but does so from the perspective of cognitive science and does not 
discuss neural activity in terms of dynamics per se. As far as I am aware, issues pertaining to 
dynamical systems theory in terms of neuroscience proper have not been discussed until fairly 
recently (e.g., Chemero & Silberstein, 2008; Chirimuuta, 2018; Favela, 2019, 2020; Ross, 2015) 
and have not received nearly as much attention as in the cognitive sciences and philosophy of 
mind. Consequently, the topic of dynamical systems theory in neuroscience remains a relatively 
novel source of material for philosophers. 
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which is an epistemological claim centering on the idea that cognitive agents can be understood 
as dynamical systems (Chemero, 2000; van Gelder, 2006). Taken in isolation, that idea need not 
be controversial because it merely advocates for the use of, for example, data analysis methods 
from dynamical systems theory (e.g., differential equations) to generate hypotheses, create 
models, and to quantify cognition and related phenomena (e.g., goal-directed behavior). 
However, it becomes more provocative when coupled with the second claim: the nature 
hypothesis, which is an ontological thesis centering on the idea that cognitive agents are 
dynamical systems. What makes this second claim controversial is that it eschews explaining 
cognition in terms of information processing, in particular, it rejects understanding cognition as 
essentially computational or representational. This makes the first claim more provocative 
because it has the consequence of removing the need to appeal to the stronger forms of 
“representations” invoked in cognitive science research (e.g., representations with semantic 
properties; Pitt, 2020). Given that information-processing accounts are currently accepted by 
many to be the “thoroughly entrenched conception” of cognition and neural systems (Shapiro, 
2013, p. 362), such that it would be either “confusion or brazenness” (Shapiro, 2013, pp. 362-
363) to reject explaining mental activity and behavior in computational and representational 
terms (cf. Favela & Martin, 2017), it is not surprising that the dynamical hypothesis draws many 
a skeptical eye from contemporary researchers. The goal of this section is not to defend or reject 
the dynamical hypothesis. In keeping with the thesis of this section, I merely aim to demonstrate 
that dynamical systems theory—both in terms of epistemology (i.e., methods) and metaphysics 
(i.e., the nature of cognitive systems)—is not as novel to neuroscience as one could believe based 
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on the ways it is discussed in the literature.4 Instead, its increasing popularity is in fact a return to 
practices that were common in the history of neuroscience. As a historical point, that goal is 
achievable without taking a stand on the dynamical hypothesis’ metaphysical claim. 
Accordingly, as I assume readers are unfamiliar with it, a brief introduction to dynamical 
systems theory is provided in the following subsection. After, I provide historical examples of its 
application. 
 
2.1. A very concise introduction to dynamical systems theory 
There are many excellent general introductions to dynamical systems theory (e.g., 
Alligood, Sauer, & Yorke, 2000; Fuchs, 2013; Guckenheimer & Holmes, 1983; Strogatz, 2015), 
as well as its applications in the mind sciences (e.g., Beer, 2000; Chemero, 2009; Clark, 1997; 
Guastello, Koopmans, & Pincus, 2011; Port, 2006; Riley & Holden, 2012; Thelen & Smith, 
1994). The current introduction is aimed at providing a general overview and giving a sense of 
 
4 As stated in the previous footnote, when dynamical systems theory is discussed in the 
philosophy literature, it is typically in terms of the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind, 
and not neuroscience or the philosophy of neuroscience per se. With that said, when dynamical 
systems theory is mentioned in that later discipline, it is as if it is novel in neuroscience research. 
One specific example comes from Bechtel who says in regard to new developments in systems 
biology that “the one that has attracted [his] interest, is the development of mathematical tools 
that enable researchers to represent the organization and behavior of systems of large numbers of 
components that interact non-linearly and are organized non-sequentially. These include the tools 
of … dynamical systems theory” (Bechtel, 2017, p. 26). Another example is Chirimuuta, who 
states that the “Techniques of … dynamical systems analysis, imported from other branches of 
science, have become popular in the quest to simplify the brain” (Chirimuuta, 2018, p. 867), and 
then discusses examples of fairly recent applications of dynamical systems theory in 
neuroscience. A third specific example comes from Barrett, who discusses the increasing 
primacy of viewing the brain in dynamical terms when he claims that “the problem raised by 
neuroscience research of the past few decades is that it has added a whole new layer of 
complexity to the brain, namely dynamical complexity” (Barrett, 2016, p. 165). Other examples 
include Ash & Welshon, 2020; Barandiaran & Moreno, 2006; Bechtel, 2015; Burnston, 2019; 
Golonka & Wilson, 2019; Lins & Schöner, 2014; Lyre, 2018; Meyer, 2018; Thomson & 
Piccinini, 2018; Venturelli, 2016; Zednik, 2014. 
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the aspects of dynamical systems theory that will be most significant in later sections (Favela, 
2020). To begin, dynamical systems theory is a branch of mathematics that can evaluate both 
abstract and physical systems as they change over time. One way to understand how dynamical 
systems theory is applied is in terms of its quantitative and qualitative elements. The quantitative 
element is the application of mathematical equations to describe, evaluate, and measure systems. 
A common dynamical mathematical tool is differential equations, which are mathematical 
functions that capture systems’ temporal evolutions, where variables in the equations are 
continuous values, as opposed to discrete values. The qualitative element is the visual depiction 
of the dynamics by means of plotting the equations in a state space, which is the range of 
possible values of a variable as depicted by means of a phase space plot.5 
It is likely that many philosophers with at least some familiarity with dynamical systems 
theory know it by way of van Gelder’s discussion of the Watt centrifugal governor example (van 
Gelder, 1995). Because that example is best described by van Gelder himself, I refer readers to 
that primary source (for those interested in secondary sources, I recommend Chemero, 2000 and 
Shapiro, 2019). Moreover, that example has been the target of much debate (e.g., Eliasmith, 
1997), which I do not wish to detract from the current aim of providing a concise and 
uncontroversial account of dynamical systems theory. Accordingly, here I provide pendulum 
 
5 It is worth noting here that the word ‘qualitative’ is commonly used in another way in 
discussions of dynamical systems theory. Here, “qualitative” is utilized in a manner consistent 
with those usages that refer to a visual depiction of a phenomenon, like a graph, and is contrasted 
with “quantitative,” which provides a numerical depiction, like a differential equation (e.g., 
Alligood, Sauer, & Yorke, 1997, p. 279; Barrat, Barthelemy, & Vespignani, 2008, p. 93; Beer, 
2000, p. 92). It is also common for ‘qualitative’ to refer to the way of being of the phenomena 
being analyzed or depicted via dynamical systems theory. For example, water can undergo 
“qualitative” shifts among gaseous, liquid, and solid state ways of being. 
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dynamics as a more straightforward example. The quantitative element of a dynamical systems 
account of pendulum dynamics is the following: 
 𝑑!𝜃𝑑𝑡! + 𝑔𝑙 sin 𝜃 = 0 (1) 
In this differential equation, 0 is the pendulum swing, which is the phenomenon of interest. 
Angular displacement of arm (𝜃), gravitational acceleration (𝑔), and pendulum length (𝑙) are the 
identified variables contributing to and most responsible for the dynamics of the phenomenon of 
interest. The qualitative element is the phase space plot of the pendulum swinging (Figure 1). It 
is important to keep in mind that a qualitative description of the full range of the system’s 
dynamics via a state space is not intended to provide the kind of information or understanding 
that a diagram does. In the current context, a diagram of pendulum dynamics (Figure 1A) is 
intended to provide understanding of the dynamics in real space. Here, the movement of a 
pendulum across two-dimensional space. The state space of pendulum dynamics (Figure 1B) is 
intended to provide understanding of the dynamics abstractly. Here, the y-axis illustrates the 
velocity of the pendulum over time and the x-axis illustrates the angle of the pendulum at a time. 
For example, looking at (0, 0) on the phase space plot (Figure 1B), tells you that the pendulum is 
around the resting position, and (-2π, 0) and (2π, 0) illustrates the same motion but at opposite 
valued arm angles. Hence, the diagram provides an understanding of movement in actual 
physical space and the state space provides abstract understanding of the temporal space. Thus, 
taken together, the quantitative (e.g., differential equation) and qualitative (i.e., state space plot) 
elements are intended to provide explanations (e.g., contributions of variables) and 
understanding (i.e., abstract nature of the dynamics over time) of the phenomenon of interest. 
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Figure 1. Depictions of pendulum dynamics. (A) Diagram of pendulum dynamics. The diagram 
is intended to provide understanding of the dynamics in real space. Here, the movement of a 
pendulum across two-dimensional space. (B) Phase space plot of pendulum dynamics. The state 
space is intended to provide understanding of the dynamics abstractly. Here, the y-axis illustrates 
the velocity of the pendulum over time ("#"$) and the x-axis illustrates the pendulum arm’s angle 
at a time. Whereas the diagram (A) provides understanding of the actual physical space, the state 
space (B) provides abstract understanding of the temporal space. (Modified and reprinted with 
permission from Krishnavedala (2012). CC0 1.0 and Krishnavedala (2014). CC BY-SA 4.0.) 
 
2.1.1. Dimensionality reduction 
A more advanced topic than typically discussed in introductions to dynamical systems 
theory (especially in terms of the mind sciences), but one that will be crucial in later sections, is 
the intersection of dynamical systems theory and dimensionality reduction. In statistics and other 
forms of data analysis (e.g., machine learning), dimensionality (or dimensions) refers to the 
informative features of a dataset. For example, medical data such as blood pressure, temperature, 
white blood cell count, etc., are all features—or inputs—of a dataset obtained for the purpose of 
diagnosing an illness—or output. High-dimensional data refers to datasets with a “high” number 
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(a relative amount) of features such that determining their relationships to each other and the 
phenomenon of interest can be computationally exceedingly demanding. For example, datasets 
comprised of gene expression are paradigmatic cases of high-dimensional data as there are 
seemingly innumerable relationships among genes, different temporal scales, etc. Dimensionality 
reduction, in the simplest terms, is a data processing strategy that attempts to cut down on the 
number of a dataset’s features without losing valuable information (Hinton & Salakhutdinov, 
2006; Nguyen & Holmes, 2019; Sorzano, Vargas, & Pascual-Montano, 2014). This is typically 
done in two general ways: filtering variables from the original dataset to keep only what is most 
relevant or exploiting redundancy in input data to find fewer new variables that contain the same 
information (Cohen, 2017; Sorzano et al., 2014). As with any data processing or analysis 
techniques, one must be aware of the limitations of dimensionality reduction (Carlson, Goddard, 
Kaplan, Klein, & Ritchie, 2018; Jonas & Kording, 2017). Yet, there are many virtues to 
employing dimensionality reduction on high-dimensional datasets, including its ability to: filter 
out meaningless noise (Cohen, 2017), help control for incorrect intuitions about relationships 
among variables (Holmes & Huber, 2018), increase a dataset’s statistical power (Nguyen & 
Holmes, 2019), and reveal deeper organizational relationships and structures (Batista, 2014). 
Dimensionality reduction is not exclusive to dynamical systems theory. But for the aims 
of this paper, the most important way dimensionality reduction intersects with dynamical 
systems theory is for the purpose of reducing the number of variables needed to account for even 
the most complex of data from behavioral and cognitive tasks, as well as the underlying neural 
processes. With simple—usually human-made—systems, it can be relatively straightforward to 
identify the most relevant variables to account for the phenomenon of interest. As discussed 
above, the full range of pendulum dynamics can be understood via three variables: angular arm 
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displacement (𝜃), gravitational acceleration (𝑔), and pendulum length (𝑙). When it comes to 
neural systems and their related behaviors, however, variable identification is typically nowhere 
near as straightforward (Churchland, A. K. & Abbott, 2016; Churchland, M. M. et al., 2012; 
Cunningham & Byron, 2014; Frégnac, 2017; Williamson, Doiron, Smith, & Byron, 2019). Since 
it is crucial to identify the relevant dimensions (i.e., features, variables) when developing models 
and equations of dynamical systems, various dimensionality reduction analyses can be 
employed. These methods include, but are not limited to, linear methods such as correspondence 
analysis and nonlinear methods such as diffusion maps (Nguyen & Holmes, 2019). A popular 
method of dimensionality reduction in the mind sciences, and one that will come up in later 
section, is principal component analysis. 
Here, I provide a brief and conceptually-focused introduction to principal component 
analysis (PCA; see Jolliffe & Cadima, 2016 for a more technical introduction). While PCA has 
been around since the early-1900s, it was not until much more recently that the computational 
resources were available to leverage its techniques on high-dimensional datasets. The basic idea 
underlying PCA is to reduce a dataset’s dimensionality while preserving variability. Here, 
preserving variability means discovering new variables—principal components (PC)—with 
linear functions that match those in the original input data. Moreover, those new variables should 
maximize variance and be uncorrelated with each other (Jolliffe & Cadima, 2016). Werner and 
colleagues provide fish body measurements as an illustrative and simple example of PCA 
(Werner, Rink, Riedel-Kruse, & Friedrich, 2014). In this example, the input dataset contains 
height and length measurements of various fish (Figure 2A). As it is assumed those two 
dimensions are strongly correlated, the PCA defines a change of coordinate systems from the 
original two-dimensional (height, length) data space to a single dimension (first shape score) data 
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space (Figure 2B). This reduction from two dimensions to one dimension retains the maximum 
amount of the original dataset’s variability. 
 
 
Figure 2. Principal component analysis (PCA) example. (A) Fish body measurements provide 
the input dataset, with height and length obtained from N individuals. (B) Height and length are 
assumed to be strongly correlated. PCA defines a change of coordinate system from the original 
(height, length)-axes (here, the x- and y-axes) to a new axes (B1 and B2), which depict the 
principle axes of the dimensions that covary. The process of defining a new coordinate system 
(V) corresponds to a reduction of the dimensionality of the data space, which also retains most of 
the data’s variability. (Modified and reprinted with permission from Werner, Rink, Riedel-Kruse, 
& Friedrich (2014). CC BY 4.0.) 
 
As in the example of fish measurements (Figure 2), when the various dimensionality 
reduction methods intersect with dynamical systems approaches, it is usually for the purpose of 
helping investigators get an epistemological grip on unwieldy data by contributing to the 
identification of the most relevant variables among multivariate datasets. Although 
dimensionality reduction in its contemporary form (e.g., via neural networks and other kinds of 
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machine learning) is relatively new (~early-2000s), issues concerning how to cope with high-
dimensional data have been explicitly discussed in computer science (e.g., the “curse of 
dimensionality;” Bellman, 1961) and statistics (Finney, 1977) since the mid-1900s. It was around 
that time (give a decade back or two) that both dynamical systems approaches and forms of 
dimensionality reduction were contributing to some of the most significant research in 
neuroscience, namely, the Hodgkin-Huxley and FitzHugh-Nagumo models. In the following 
section, I present these cases to motivate the claim that contemporary applications of dynamical 
systems theory in neuroscience is not as much pioneering as it is a revival. 
 
2.2. Dynamical systems theory in neuroscience, then and now 
As mentioned above, it is common to view dynamical systems theory as merely an 
alternative or supplement to the information-processing approaches purported to be dominant in 
the contemporary mind sciences (e.g., Eliasmith, 1996; Kaplan & Bechtel, 2011). In this section, 
I present two historical cases to motivate both the claim that dynamical approaches were 
common in neuroscience research in the mid-1900s and that dimensionality reduction was part of 
practices that facilitated some of the field’s most lauded successes. I begin with Hodgkin and 
Huxley’s (1952) canonical model of action potentials. This Nobel Prize-earning work has been 
described as “elegant,” “groundbreaking,” and the most successful quantitative model in 
neuroscience (Gerstner, Kistler, Naud, & Paninski, 2014; Koch, 1999). A major feature of this 
work was the identification of the action potential (i.e., neuron spike) as a dynamic (i.e., 
temporal) event defined by relatively few variables (i.e., dimensions, elements). The canonical 
Hodgkin-Huxley model is as follows: 
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 𝐼 = 𝐶% 𝑑𝑉𝑑𝑡 + ?̅?&𝑛'(𝑉 − 𝑉&) + ?̅?()𝑚*ℎ(𝑉 − 𝑉()) + ?̅?+(𝑉 − 𝑉+) (2) 
Key elements of the model are: I (total membrane current as a function of time and voltage), 𝐶% 
(cell membrane capacity per unit), 𝑑𝑉 (change of membrane potential from resting value), 𝑑𝑡 
(change over time), and 𝑔's (ions such as sodium [𝑁𝑎] and potassium [𝐾]). Hodgkin and Huxley 
were able to successfully apply dynamical systems theory in the form of differential equations 
because they conceptualized the phenomenon of interest—namely, action potentials in the squid 
giant axon—as essentially a temporal event. From a dynamical perspective, their job became one 
of identifying the relevant variables responsible for the behavior. In this light, it is easy to see the 
Hodgkin-Huxley canonical model as an early application of a version of the dynamical 
hypothesis. While the original dynamical hypothesis is a set of claims concerning cognitive 
agents, here the concern is physiology. Specifically, Hodgkin and Huxley’s investigative 
framework was dynamical through and through in that it approached the phenomenon of interest 
in terms of its being both able to be understood as a dynamical system (i.e., modeled via 
differential equations) and as being a dynamical system (i.e., defining the action potential as a 
temporal event).6 
 
6 One potential objection to this interpretation of the Hodgkin-Huxley canonical model as 
supporting understanding mid-1900s neuroscience research through the lens of the dynamical 
hypothesis can be raised from proponents of mechanistic explanations. Mechanistic explanations 
are commonly considered to be the dominant explanatory approach to the mind sciences, and the 
life sciences in general (Craver & Tabery, 2019). There is an enormous literature concerning the 
nature of mechanistic explanations and how they contrast with rival explanatory methods like 
dynamical explanations (e.g., Chemero & Silberstein, 2008; Gervais, 2015; Zednik, 2011). 
Additionally, there is literature describing the Hodgkin-Huxley model as a paradigmatic example 
of mechanistic explanation (e.g., Craver, 2008; Craver & Kaplan, 2020). I do not wish to enter 
that debate here as it goes beyond the scope of my current aims. It is enough, I believe, to 
motivate that it is reasonable to interpret the Hodgkin-Huxley model as an example of dynamical 
systems theory playing a central role in neuroscience research in the mid-1900s. 
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As with any attempts at modeling complicated phenomena, it can be quite challenging to 
select the best variables to account for the target of interest. This is especially true with 
biological entities that usually have features that often interact nonlinearly. Consequently, many 
biological phenomena produce high-dimensional data. To the uninitiated, the Hodgkin-Huxley 
model presented above may seem quite complicated due to the appearance of many variables. 
Even if the model is seemingly complicated, Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) went through many 
iterations of models before developing the streamlined canonical model presented above. 
Moreover, defining the model above actually requires defining three of the variables with 
differential equations of their own, such that the Hodgkin-Huxley model, fully defined, is the 
following four-dimensional model: 
 𝐼 = 𝐶% 𝑑𝑉𝑑𝑡 + ?̅?&𝑛'(𝑉 − 𝑉&) + ?̅?()𝑚*ℎ(𝑉 − 𝑉()) + ?̅?+(𝑉 − 𝑉+) (2) 
where 
 𝑑𝑛 𝑑𝑡9 = 𝛼,(1 − 𝑛) − 𝛽,𝑛, (3) 
 𝑑𝑚 𝑑𝑡9 = 𝛼-(1 − 𝑚) − 𝛽-𝑚, (4) 
 𝑑ℎ 𝑑𝑡9 = 𝛼.(1 − ℎ) − 𝛽.ℎ (5) 
 
Seeing that the fully defined Hodgkin-Huxley canonical model is four differential equations 
makes clearer that the model cannot be solved analytically. Moreover, plotting the model along 
four dimensions creates a phase space plot that is challenging to interpret (Gerstner et al., 2014). 
Such cases are examples of the work dimensionality reduction can do to facilitate understanding 
of high-dimensional data. 
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The FitzHugh-Nagumo model of neuron excitability (FitzHugh, 1961; Nagumo, Arimoto, 
& Yoshizawa, 1962) is essentially the product of applying dimensionality reduction to the 
Hodgkin-Huxley model. Whereas the fully defined Hodgkin-Huxley model is a four-dimensional 
set of differential equations, the FitzHugh-Nagumo model is a pair of two-dimensional 
differential equations: 
 ?̇? = 𝑉 − 𝑉*3 −𝑊 + 𝐼 (6) 
 ?̇? = 0.08(𝑉 + 0.7 − 0.8𝑊) (7) 
 
What is more, the FitzHugh-Nagumo model includes only three variables: 𝐼 (stimulus current 
magnitude), 𝑉 (cell membrane potential), and 𝑊 (recovery variable). Whereas the fully defined 
Hodgkin-Huxley model requires a four-dimensional phase space plot to depict the full range of 
behavior, the full range of behavior of the FitzHugh-Nagumo model can be depicted by a simpler 
two-dimensional phase space plot (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3. Phase space plot of FitzHugh-Nagumo model. With just two dimensions—𝑉 
(membrane potential) and 𝑊 (recovery variable)—the phase space plot depicts the full range of 
behavioral trajectories from a range of initial conditions. (Modified and reprinted with 
permission from Scholarpedia. CC BY-NC-SA 3.0.) 
 
The FitzHugh-Nagumo model captures the full temporal range of neuronal excitation and 
propagation with two electrochemical properties: potassium and sodium ion flows (Izhikevich & 
FitzHugh, 2006). It is worth noting that he FitzHugh-Nagumo model is less biologically realistic 
than the Hodgkin-Huxley model because it includes less empirically validated dimensions. With 
that said, it is still able to capture much of the same key information that the Hodgkin-Huxley 
model does. Though the Hodgkin-Huxley model is more biologically realistic than the FitzHugh-
Nagumo model, only temporal projections of its four-dimensional phase trajectories can be 
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simultaneously observed, which has the consequence of not allowing the model’s solution to be 
observed via a single plot (Izhikevich & FitzHugh, 2006). In other words, a plot of the Hodgkin-
Huxley model can depict direction of activity over time (i.e., projections), but not the states that 
it will settle in. With only two dimensions, the entire solution of the FitzHugh-Nagumo model 
can be plotted. Consequently, not only is the temporal trajectory of activity depicted (and 
maintained from the Hodgkin-Huxley model), but so too is the solution, namely, the states that 
the system settles in (i.e., properties not revealed by plotting the four dimensions of the Hodgkin-
Huxley model). Thus, not only does the FitzHugh-Nagumo model capture the key information 
concerning the properties of excitation and propagation that contribute to single-neuron spiking 
that the Hodgkin-Huxley model does, but by having its full solution plotted on two dimensions it 
reveals nonlinearities and feedback that contribute to spiking activity (Izhikevich, 2007; 
Izhikevich & FitzHugh, 2006). In that way, the FitzHugh-Nagumo model is a clear example of 
dimensional reduction methods integrated with dynamical systems theory methods in the history 
of neuroscience. Specifically, information about the phenomenon of interest—namely, single-
neuron activity—that is captured by four dimensions in the Hodgkin-Huxley model is maintained 
when reduced to the two dimensions “principle components” in the FitzHugh-Nagumo model. It 
is worth noting that other early applications of PCA in the mind sciences are found in Elman’s 
work on connectionist models of language (Elman, 1991) and in biophysics by Haken and Kelso 
on self-organization in the brain during behavioral tasks (Kelso & Haken, 1995). 
I have presented the Hodgkin-Huxley model and FitzHugh-Nagumo model as cases of 
dynamical systems theory being employed in some of the major achievements in the history of 
neuroscience. Moreover, the latter model also integrated dimensionality reduction methodology. 
What I have not done is presented those cases as a means to demonstrate that dynamical 
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approaches provided the only investigative framework employed in the neurosciences, broadly 
construed. There should be no doubt that mechanistic and reductionistic approaches were 
common and that such research was successfully conducted without dynamical systems concepts 
or methods. With that said, the above two cases should make it clear that it is incorrect to view 
dynamical systems theory as a novel development in contemporary neuroscience (see footnote 4 
above). Even the most cutting edge neuroscience research—from microscale genetics to 
macroscale behavior—with its heavy focus on employing various types of dimensionality 
reducing methods (Churchland, A. K. & Abbott, 2016; Fan & Markram, 2019; Frégnac, 2017) 
have as forerunners research in the mid-1900s that can reasonably be identified as dynamical 
(Kass et al., 2018). It is in that sense that there is a dynamical renaissance in contemporary 
neuroscience, and that it is clear that a version of the knowledge hypothesis part of the dynamical 
hypothesis has turned out to be true, namely, that at least some of the underlying physiology of 
cognitive systems can be understood as a dynamical system, and not as computational. In the 
following section, I present representational and dynamical systems explanations of motor 
control in order to demonstrate how the dynamical renaissance is motivating a reexamination of 
the necessity of appealing to “representations” in explanations of neural phenomena. 
 
3. W(h)ither representations? 
Thus far, I have attempted to make the primarily historical and weaker point that the 
increased presence of dynamical systems theory in contemporary neuroscience is more akin to a 
renaissance than a novel introduction. In this section I aim to make a stronger point: along with 
utilizing concepts and methods, the revival of dynamical systems theory in contemporary 
neuroscience is driving a reassessment of the necessity of the concept “representation” in 
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explanations of neural phenomena. This point parallels the nature hypothesis part of the 
dynamical hypothesis—namely, that cognitive agents are dynamical systems—and states that 
neural systems are dynamical systems. As discussed above, whereas the knowledge hypothesis 
part of the dynamical hypothesis landed quietly, the nature hypothesis arrived loudly. The reason 
is that central to the nature hypothesis is the metaphysical claim that cognition is not essentially 
computational or representational in nature (van Gelder, 1995). Given that computations and 
representations are defining features of the purportedly dominant information-processing 
frameworks in the mind sciences since at least the cognitive revolution (~1950s), it is no wonder 
that it has been said that it would be either “confusion or brazenness” (Shapiro, 2013, pp. 362-
363) to reject explaining cognition—or neural systems—in computational and representational 
terms. In this section, I aim to demonstrate that—although it may indeed be brazen—it is 
certainly not confused to think that the phenomena investigated by the neurosciences can be 
explained without appeal to representations. I do so by discussing representational and 
dynamical accounts of motor control. 
 
3.1. Motor control 
Motor control is the ability of a system to generate goal-directed and coordinated 
movements with the body and environment (Latash, Levin, Scholz, & Schöner, 2010). A simple 
example of motor control is when a monkey is hanging from a tree branch with one hand and 
reaches for a piece of fruit with the other hand. The goal is to not fall and get something to eat at 
the same time. What is being coordinated is the body (arms, hands, legs, etc.), location of tree 
branch in relation to body, and location of fruit in relation to body and tree. There are various 
theories for understanding motor control, with their own background assumptions, such as 
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artificial intelligence/robotics, ecological, neuroanatomical, and synergetics/self-organization 
(Turvey & Fonseca, 2008). Here, I focus on the traditionally predominant approaches in 
neuroscience that have focused on the central nervous system (CNS) and sensorimotor 
transformations (Jordan & Wolpert, 2000). In short, these approaches are information-processing 
frameworks, where the motor system (i.e., limbs, joints, and muscles) receives motor commands 
(e.g., force, reach, torque adjustments; Diedrichsen, 2012) from the controller located in the CNS 
(Jordan & Wolpert, 2000). Moreover, representations and the information they encode are 
fundamental to this approach. This is admittedly a very general overview of motor control. My 
aim here is not to provide a thorough introduction to motor control, but to focus on what can 
broadly be referred to as “representational” and “dynamical systems” approaches to motor 
control. The presentation of these approaches is intended to demonstrate that the renaissance of 
dynamical systems theory in contemporary neuroscience is motivating nonrepresentational 
explanations of various neural phenomena. 
 
3.2. Representational accounts of motor control 
There is a long history in neuroscience and related fields (e.g., neurology) during which 
representations have played a central role in accounts of motor control (for discussion of 
competing applications of the term in the history of neuroscience, see Chirimuuta, 2019). This 
history includes usages such as: the somatosensory cortex represents the body (e.g., Brecht, 
2017), neuronal activity patterns represent systematic relationships with body and world (e.g., S1 
somatotopic maps; Wilson & Moore, 2015), and neurons are vehicles that represent semantic 
information for goal-directed behavior (Thomson & Piccinini, 2018). In many areas of current 
neuroscience research, “representations” have been cashed out in terms of coding (Brette, 2019; 
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Dehaene, 2014; Koch & Marcus, 2014). As both a literal and metaphorical term, “coding” 
(including “decoding” and “encoding”) has also come to be the way representations involved in 
motor control are understood (Shenoy, Sahani, & Churchland, 2013; Thomson & Piccinini, 
2018). Like “representation,” there are various uses of the term “coding.” As Brette (2019) 
points out, the phrase “neural coding” appears in over 15,000 papers in a Google Scholar search 
of literature from the past ten years. For that reason, I will not attempt to provide an all-
encompassing definition of “coding” or “neural coding.” Instead, I limit discussion to “coding” 
in terms of representations involved in motor control. 
Given that information-processing approaches have such a large presence in 
contemporary neuroscience, it is unsurprising that concepts from computer science are appealed 
to when attempting to explain key claims of the approach, namely, that cognitive and neural 
systems are computational and representational in nature. As a starting point, motor control from 
an information-processing perspective can be understood in the following terms: 
[T]he motor system can be considered a system whose inputs are the motor 
commands emanating from the controller within the central nervous system … To 
determine the behavior of the system in response to this input, an additional set of 
variables, called state variables, also must be known. For example, in a robotic 
model of the arm, the motor command would represent the torques generated 
around the joints and the state variables would be the joint angles and angular 
velocities. Taken together, the inputs and the state variables are sufficient to 
determine the future behavior of the system. (Jordan & Wolpert, 2000, p. 601; 
italics in original) 
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Along those lines, the focus of motor control research in neuroscience has been to explain how 
such commands and state variables are encoded and decoded (Shenoy et al., 2013). In addition, 
the primary research target has been single neurons and the ways parameters are coded to control 
cortical output. From this general approach, single neurons provide the vehicles for encoded and 
decoded content, such as the content of state variable parameters. Thus, the job of the 
neuroscientist has been to describe the firing of individual neurons in the motor cortex as a 
function of various parameters (i.e., state variables) for concurrent or upcoming movements 
(Shenoy et al., 2013, pp. 340-341). 
Consider a standard neuroscience experiment: the instructed-delay task. In this task, 
experimental subjects (e.g., human, monkey, etc.) are instructed which movements they should 
make after a cue tells them to make the movement (Kandel, Schwartz, & Jessell, 2000). A typical 
experimental setup involves a subject sitting in a chair in front of a touch screen while 
behavioral, muscle, and/or neural measurements are recorded. A basic task could involve the 
subject visually fixating on a green target on the screen and touching it with their hand (Figure 
4A), another red target appears so they know where their movement must be made, and after a 
delay, the subject is presented with the green target and then moves to the spot where the red 
target was (Shenoy et al., 2013). One kind of representational account of this event is as follows: 
The task (i.e., reaching targets with a hand) is encoded (represented) in the controller located in 
the CNS, which outputs commands to the motor system. The controller incorporates encoded 
(represented) sensory information as well, namely, visual information in the form of green and 
red targets. The controller also incorporates information from state variables that have encoded 
(represented) states of the system itself, such as arm angle, torques around the elbow joint, etc. In 
view of that story, the neuroscientist working on motor control focuses her research on single 
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neurons by elucidating the relevant state variables encoded and identifying the tuning of those 
parameters necessary to produce successful movement (Figure 4B). 
 
 
Figure 4. Representational and dynamical systems accounts of motor control. (A) In an 
instructed-delay task, a participant begins by focusing on a starting point, such as a green target, 
is presented another target (e.g., red square), and is instructed to point to the spot the second 
target was located after being presented with the first target. Behavioral, muscle, and/or neural 
measurements are recorded during the task. (B) Representational accounts of motor control 
traditionally focus on single neurons (e.g., Jordan & Wolpert, 2000). The research aim is to 
identify the firing rate (𝑟) of single neurons (𝑛) in the motor cortex that describe functions of 
various parameters (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚/) that represent concurrent or upcoming movements (equation 1). 
Models of neuronal populations (equation 2) can integrate parameter functions defined at the 
single neuron. Motor commands are encoded in motor neurons via pulses that provide state 
variable profiles (B, bottom). (C) Dynamical systems accounts of motor control often focus on 
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neural populations. The research aim is to elucidate neural population cortical activity (𝒓(𝑡)) that 
is mapped onto muscle activity (𝒎(𝑡)), as well as other intermediating circuits (𝐺[𝑥]), that 
produce body movements in a manner that achieves the system’s aims (equation 3). 𝒓(𝑡) can be 
defined to capture neural population temporal activity (?̇?) that is determined by local motor 
cortex circuitry (ℎ(𝑥)) and inputs from other areas of the system (𝐮(𝑡)) (equation 4). State space 
plot of rotational dynamics (bottom). Data from Churchland et al. (2012) were reduced via jPCA 
to two dimensions that capture a significant portion of the neural population’s variance. Here, 
“a.u.” refers to “arbitrary units,” which is acceptable because the plot depicts the abstract nature 
of the population’s dynamics and not its actual dynamics in real space. (Modified and reprinted 
with permission from Pixabay and SVG Silh. CC0 1.0 (A); Modified and reprinted with 
permission from Eyal et al. (2018). CC BY 4.0 and Sartori et al. (2017). CC BY 4.0 (B); and 
Modified and reprinted with permission from Prior (2018). CC BY 4.0 and Lebedev et al., 
(2019). CC BY 4.0 (C).) 
 
Shenoy and colleagues (2013) describe the representational perspective as focused on 
explaining single-neuron activity in terms of tuning for movement parameters (Shenoy et al., 
2013, p. 340). They present the following as the general model adhered to by such approaches: 
 𝑟,(𝑡) = 𝑓,(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚0(𝑡), 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚!(𝑡), . 	. 	. ) (8) 
where the firing rate (𝑟) of single neurons (𝑛) in the motor cortex are described as functions of 
various parameters (𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚/) representing concurrent or upcoming movements. If it seems that 
the number of relevant parameters could be enormous, that is because it is. Part of the reason is 
because identifying each parameter, as well as defining its tuning, must also take into account 
covariates such as target locations, limb kinematics, proprioceptor activity, muscular synergies, 
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and more (Shenoy et al., 2013). It is worth pointing out that although the general model defined 
by Shenoy and colleagues that focuses on single-neuron activity is true of much neuroscience 
research on motor control, the general idea also applies to research on neuronal populations (e.g., 
Sartori, Yavuz, & Farina, 2017). In such cases, the general model of neuronal populations 
contributing to motor control is as follows: 
 𝐷𝑅, = 1𝑡, − 𝑡,10 (9) 
where 𝑅 refers to the parameters encoded in single neurons that code for movement instructions 
to the body and 𝐷 refers to the activity of neuronal populations that map to and from the body. 
Shenoy et al.’s general model of single neurons can be readily incorporated into the population 
model by defining 𝑅 as 𝑓,(𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚0(𝑡), 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑚!(𝑡), . 	. 	. ). Thus, even if a model of motor control 
is focused on neuronal populations, the action—that is, the representational action—remains 
located in the single neurons that state variables are encoded in. In summary, representational 
accounts understand motor control as a form of information processing, where movement is 
controlled beforehand and concurrently, said movements are encoded in single neurons, and 
neuronal activity is tuned to various parameters (i.e., state variables) that contribute to the action 
(e.g., limb velocity, joint torque, etc.). 
 
3.3. Dynamical systems accounts of motor control 
Although representational accounts of motor control can utilize dynamical systems theory 
methods (e.g., treating data as continuous and applying differential equations; e.g., Schöner et 
al., 2016), there can be fundamental differences between them insofar as explaining motor 
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control goes.7 First, dynamical systems accounts of motor control focus on neural dynamics, 
specifically, the dynamics of neural populations (Figure 4C). This contrasts with representational 
accounts that focus on the coding (i.e., representation) of movement parameters (e.g., body 
states, such as limb angles, and world states, such as target location), and how those parameters 
are tuned in single neurons. Second, the dynamical systems approach focuses on the state of the 
system producing movement and not what outputs of the system are represented. In other words, 
the dynamical systems approach is centrally concerned with system dynamics (or rules) that 
constitute movement (Churchland et al., 2012; Gallego et al., 2017; Michaels, Dann, & 
Scherberger, 2016) and representational approaches are centrally concerned with how the system 
codes for current and future movements (Heitmann et al., 2015; Schöner et al., 2016). 
One way to begin to understand the dynamical systems approach to motor control is in 
terms of how it conceptualizes the nervous systems. Whereas the representational approach 
views the nervous system as, well, a representational system, the dynamical systems approach 
views the nervous system as a pattern-generating system. The patterns the nervous system 
generates are aimed at successful movement. A general model for understanding this view of the 
nervous system is as follows (Shenoy et al., 2013): 
 𝒎(𝑡) = 𝐺[𝒓(𝑡)] (10) 
 
7 It is important to reiterate the scope of the current project. The aim is not to provide accounts of 
“representational” and “dynamical systems” approaches to motor control in toto. Instead, it is to 
frame the differences in a way that highlights how they can have deeply diverging commitments. 
Consequently, it is not a simple binary division between the two. The fact is that there is a lot of 
gray. One example is work by Schöner and colleagues (e.g., Lins & Schöner, 2014; Schöner et 
al., 2016) that clearly applies a “dynamical systems theory” approach, while also focusing on 
neuronal populations instead of single neurons, and is representational. Another example is work 
by Krakauer and colleagues (e.g., Krakauer, Ghilardi, & Ghez, 1999; Shadmehr & Krakauer, 
2008), which can be viewed as residing at the intersection of representational and dynamical 
approaches. 
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where neural populations of cortical activity (𝒓(𝑡)), are mapped onto muscle activity (𝒎(𝑡)), 
with other intermediating circuits (𝐺[𝑥]), to produce body movements in a manner that achieves 
the system’s aims (Figure 4C). The variable 𝒓(𝑡) is further defined as the following function: 
 τ?̇?(𝑡) = ℎR𝐫(𝑡)S + 𝐮(𝑡) (11) 
where neural population over time (?̇?) is determined by local motor cortex circuitry (ℎ(𝑥)) and 
inputs from other areas of the system (𝐮(𝑡)). As such, a key feature of the dynamical systems 
approach is to elucidate the ways in which movements are driven—that is, determined, 
constrained, and sustained—by temporal patterns produced by neural populations (Shenoy et al., 
2013, p. 341). 
Churchland and colleagues successfully applied this approach to motor control during 
reaching. For details of the experiment and analyses, I refer readers to the primary source 
(Churchland et al., 2012; for further discussion by the authors see Shenoy et al., 2013; and for 
critiques of the study see Lebedev et al., 2019). In short, the authors conducted both single- and 
multi-unit recordings of four monkeys’ motor and premotor cortex during an instructed-delay 
task. Although the across-trial firing rate among single neurons exhibited commonly expected 
dynamics, they also demonstrated “quasi-oscillations patterns” in the form of rotational structure 
just before movement onset (Churchland et al., 2012, p. 52). The investigators then assessed the 
neural populations to see if the same rotational structure was exhibited at the population level. 
Findings at the neural-population level included: rotational dynamics during reaching, rotational 
dynamics in the same direction across conditions (i.e., variations of the instructed-delay task), 
rotational dynamics followed from a preparatory state, and the state space of the dynamics are 
not directly related to the arm movements (Churchland et al., 2012, pp. 52-53). It is important to 
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clarify these findings, especially the fourth. In order to do so, it is necessary to explicate the data 
analyses a bit. 
Churchland and colleagues utilized a dynamical systems theory approach to analyze the 
data. In doing so, they applied the elements described in section 2 above: a quantitative element 
that incorporated dimensionality reduction and a qualitative element. In order to quantify the 
rotational dynamics, they utilized a type of principal components analysis they call “jPCA:” 
 ?̇?(𝑡, 𝑐) = 𝑀2345𝑥(𝑡, 𝑐) (12) 
where ?̇?(𝑡, 𝑐) is the population state at time 𝑡 and condition 𝑐, and 𝑀2345 is a matrix that 
captures the rotational dynamics (Churchland et al., 2012, p. 54). Datasets were reduced to six 
dimensions and then analyzed via the jPCA. The jPCA process reduced the datasets to two 
dimensions that were able to capture a significant portion of the variance. Thus, the population 
dynamics were plotted on a two-dimensional state space (e.g., Figure 4C, bottom). As discussed 
above (section 2), in dynamical systems theory, a state space can be an abstract depiction of 
dynamics and not a literal depiction of movement in real space (Figure 1). Accordingly, the state 
space plots produced from Churchland et al.’s jPCA data are not actual depictions of neural 
population dynamics, but an abstract depiction of the dynamics, which Churchland and 
colleagues refer to as “rotational” given their oscillatory nature. In other words, the rotational 
movement of the dynamics in the state space does not indicate that the real neurons from which 
the data was collected fire individually or as a population in a circular movement around a center 
point in physical space. Instead, in terms of the two identified principal components that capture 
the majority of variance (i.e., jPC1 and jPC2), from the preparatory state (red or green circle; 
Figure 4C, bottom), the dynamics can be understood as “rotational” in that they begin from a 
center point, and then their trajectory demonstrates movement away from the center and then 
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back in the direction of the center. It is in that way that the state space is an abstract depiction of 
the dynamics.8 The four findings will be easier to grasp now that the analyses themselves, 
especially the state space plots, are better understood. 
In regard to the first and second findings, the rotational dynamics (i.e., population-scale 
neural activity) during reaching were statistically the same across the different experimental 
conditions (i.e., movements to variously-located targets). Third, the various movements during 
tasks followed from the statistically same preparatory states, namely, the rotational dynamics. 
What that means is that task movements were the output of regular system dynamics instead of 
the system representing the desired outcome. That leads to the fourth—and for current purposes 
the most important—finding, the dynamics depicted by the state space (Figure 4C, bottom) do 
not depict (or represent) the real space movements they were implicated in. In short, although the 
arm movements may look “rotational” as they reach to and from the starting position in real 
space, the rotational dynamics exhibited by the state space are not representations of the arm 
movements. They are abstract depictions of the temporal dynamics of the neural populations. 
Think back to the discussion of the qualitative element of dynamical systems theory approaches 
discussed above (section 2.1). The phase space plot of pendulum dynamics (Figure 1B) is not a 
depiction of the pendulum moving in real space. It is a visual depiction of the abstract nature of 
the temporal dynamics. Correspondingly, the phase space plot of rotational dynamics (Figure 4C, 
bottom) is not a depiction of neural populations activity in real space. It is a visual depiction of 
the abstract nature of the neural population activity after being reduced to two principal 
components that account for a significant portion of the original dataset’s variability. As a result, 
 
8 Thanks to John Krakauer for discussing with me this aspect of Churchland et al.’s work, and 
attempting to clarify the model and state space plot of rotational dynamics. Any remaining 
mistakes in interpretation or presentation are mine alone. 
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the state space rotational dynamics do not imply that the neural population codes for (or 
represents) rotational movements. 
In summary, dynamical systems accounts understand motor control as a form of pattern 
generation, where the nervous system does not represent states but drives desired movements. In 
that way, the nervous system is better thought of as constituting and producing forces that turn 
out the body’s movements. Furthermore, such an approach is not about accurately representing 
or encoding state variables but as producing movements that regularly lead to successful 
outcomes or not. In this way, the dynamical approach to motor control supports the dynamical 
hypothesis. First, as Churchland and colleagues’ research demonstrates (Churchland et al., 2012; 
Shenoy et al., 2013) it is a successful application of the elements of dynamical systems theory to 
fruitful research on neural systems, namely, motor control can be understood as a dynamical 
system. Second, that research demonstrates that core topics in neuroscience can be investigated, 
explained, and understood without appeal to information-processing frameworks, especially 
without invoking representations as key features of complex and goal-directed activity. That is to 
say, motor control can be understood as a dynamical system. I do not intend for this argument to 
lead to the conclusion that representations can wither away completely from neuroscience 
research, or from work on motor control. I do intend for this argument to motivate the claim that 
representations—as well as information-processing approaches in general—need not be the 
unquestioned go to in neuroscience research. Whither representations in neuroscience? Not 
eliminated, but not absolutely necessary either. 
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4. Conclusion 
Dynamical systems theory is becoming increasingly popular in contemporary 
neuroscience (for a small sample see Breakspear, 2017; Deco et al., 2017; Honey & Sporns, 
2008; Izhikevich, 2007; Rabinovich et al., 2006; Sussillo, 2014). In spite of the increased 
prominence in neuroscience research, discussion of dynamical systems theory in neuroscience 
among philosophers has been minimal (exceptions to this include Chemero & Silberstein, 2008; 
Chirimuuta, 2018; Favela, 2019, 2020; Ross, 2015). This is slightly odd given significant 
discussion of dynamical systems in cognitive science by philosophers (see section 1 above). 
Perhaps, this is the case because philosophers have assumed that arguments applicable in 
cognitive science apply broadly to other mind sciences such as neuroscience. Yet, the place of 
dynamical systems theory in neuroscience is unique to that of cognitive science. Significant 
discussion among cognitive scientists and philosophers on the topic of dynamical systems theory 
began in the 1990s. But in neuroscience, dynamical systems theory was central in the mid-1900s, 
faded a bit, and then recently shows signs of increased applicability. For that reason alone, one 
could think philosophers (especially in history and philosophy of science; though, as mentioned 
above, see Chirimuuta, 2019) would be more interested in understanding dynamical systems 
theory in the history of neuroscience. I hope to have motivated the worth of such a project here. 
In addition, I have aimed in this paper to motivate viewing research in contemporary 
neuroscience from a dynamical systems theory approach as supporting a version of the 
dynamical hypothesis. Whereas the original dynamical hypothesis (e.g., van Gelder, 1995) 
focused on cognitive agents, the version I have in mind is broader and includes the substrates of 
cognitive systems as well. Accordingly, I argued that the concepts and methods of dynamical 
systems theory have successfully been applied to neural systems in contemporary neuroscience. 
 36 
Moreover, I have argued that such approaches have also motivated understanding neural systems 
as dynamical systems, which includes not requiring appeal to computations or representations to 
explain or understand those systems. Taken together, the historical claim—that dynamical 
approaches were prominent in the mid-1900s—and the critical claim—that representations are 
unnecessary in at least some core areas of research—demonstrate that the dynamical hypothesis 
is undergoing a renaissance in contemporary neuroscience. 
 
Acknowledgments 
The title of this paper is directly inspired by Shenoy, Sahani, and Churchland: “Indeed, 
the dynamical systems perspective may be experiencing a renaissance in neuroscience as a 
whole” (2012, p. 340). I thank Guest Editor Sarah Robins for interest in the project. Thanks to 
the anonymous reviewers for constructive and helpful feedback that I believe contributed to 
improving the paper a great deal. Thanks to John Krakauer for discussion and clarifying some of 
the technical aspects of the neuroscience. Thanks to Mary Jean Amon for extensive comments on 
earlier drafts. Finally, I would like to convey my appreciation to the Summer Seminars in 
Neuroscience and Philosophy, in c/o John Templeton Foundation and Duke University, for their 
generosity in providing funding to support open access for this article. 
 
  
 37 
References 
Alligood, K. T., Sauer, T. D., & Yorke, J. A. (2000). Chaos: An introduction to dynamical 
systems. New York, NY: Springer. 
Ash, M., & Welshon, R. (2020). Dynamicism, radical enactivism, and representational cognitive 
processes: The case of subitization. Philosophical Psychology, 1-25. 
doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1775798 
Barandiaran, X., & Moreno, A. (2006). On what makes certain dynamical systems cognitive: A 
minimally cognitive organization program. Adaptive Behavior, 14(2), 171-185. 
Barrat, A., Barthelemy, M., & Vespignani, A. (2008). Dynamical processes on complex 
networks. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Barrett, N. F (2016). Mind and value. In M. Garcia-Valdecasas, J. I. Murillo, & N. F. Barrett 
(Eds.), Biology and subjectivity: Philosophical contributions to non-reductive 
neuroscience (pp. 151-180). Switzerland: Springer. 
Batista, A. (2014). Multineuronal views of information processing. In M. S. Gazzaniga & G. R. 
Mangun (Eds.), The cognitive neurosciences (5th ed., pp. 477-489). Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
Bechtel, W. (2015). Can mechanistic explanation be reconciled with scale-free constitution and 
dynamics? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 53, 84-93. 
Bechtel, W. (2017). Systems biology: Negotiating between holism and reductionism. In S. Green 
(Ed.), Philosophy of systems biology: Perspectives from scientists and philosophers (pp. 
25-36). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. 
 38 
Bechtel, W., & Graham, G. (Eds). (1999). A companion to cognitive science. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell. 
Beer, R. D. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 
4(3), 91-99. 
Bellman, R. E. (1961). Adaptive control processes: A guided tour. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Bickle, J., & Hardcastle, V. G. (2012). Philosophy of neuroscience. eLS. Chichester, UK: John 
Wiley & Sons, Ltd. doi:10.1002/9780470015902.a002414 
Bickle, J., Mandik, P., & Landreth, A. (2019). The philosophy of neuroscience. In E. N. Zalta 
(Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2019 ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University. Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/neuroscience/  
Boden, M. A. (2006). Mind as machine: A history of cognitive science (vol. 1 & 2). New York, 
NY: Oxford University Press. 
Breakspear, M. (2017). Dynamic models of large-scale brain activity. Nature Neuroscience, 
20(3), 340-352. 
Brecht, M. (2017). The body model theory of somatosensory cortex. Neuron, 94(5), 985-992. 
Brette, R. (2019). Is coding a relevant metaphor for the brain? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 
42: e215. doi:10.1017/S0140525X19000049 
Burnston, D. C. (2019). Getting over atomism: Functional decomposition in complex neural 
systems. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, axz039. 
doi:10.1093/bjps/axz039 
 39 
Carlson, T., Goddard, E., Kaplan, D. M., Klein, C., & Ritchie, J. B. (2018). Ghosts in machine 
learning for cognitive neuroscience: Moving from data to theory. NeuroImage, 180, 88-
100. 
Chemero, A. (2000). Anti-representationalism and the dynamical stance. Philosophy of Science, 
67(4), 625-647. 
Chemero, A. (2009). Radical embodied cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Chemero, A., & Silberstein, M. (2008). After the philosophy of mind: Replacing scholasticism 
with science. Philosophy of Science, 75(1), 1-27. 
Chirimuuta, M. (2018). Explanation in computational neuroscience: Causal and non-causal. The 
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 69(3), 849-880. 
Chirimuuta, M. (2019). Synthesis of contraries: Hughlings Jackson on sensory-motor 
representation in the brain. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 75, 34-44. 
Churchland, P. S. (2002). Brain-wise: Studies in neurophilosophy. Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
Churchland, A. K., & Abbott, L. F. (2016). Conceptual and technical advances define a key 
moment for theoretical neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience, 19(3), 348-349. 
Churchland, M. M., Cunningham, J. P., Kaufman, M. T., Foster, J. D., Nuyujukian, P., Ryu, S. I., 
& Shenoy, K. V. (2012). Neural population dynamics during reaching. Nature, 
487(7405), 51-56. 
Clark, A. (1997). The dynamical challenge. Cognitive Science, 21(4), 461-481. 
Cohen, M. X. (2017). MATLAB for brain and cognitive scientists. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Combley, R. (Ed.). (2011). Cambridge business English dictionary. Cambridge University Press. 
 40 
Cooper, R. P., & Shallice, T. (2010). Cognitive neuroscience: The troubled marriage of cognitive 
science and neuroscience. Topics in Cognitive Science, 2, 398-406. 
Craver, C. F. (2007). Explaining the brain: Mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience. 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Craver, C. F. (2008). Physical law and mechanistic explanation in the Hodgkin and Huxley 
model of the action potential. Philosophy of Science, 75(5), 1022-1033. 
Craver, C. F., & Kaplan, D. M. (2020). Are more details better? On the norms of completeness 
for mechanistic explanations. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(1), 
287-319. 
Craver, C., & Tabery, J. (2019). Mechanisms in science. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy (summer 2019 ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University. 
Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/science-mechanisms/ 
Cunningham, J. P., & Byron, M. Y. (2014). Dimensionality reduction for large-scale neural 
recordings. Nature Neuroscience, 17(11), 1500-1509. 
Deco, G., Kringelbach, M. L., Jirsa, V. K., & Ritter, P. (2017). The dynamics of resting 
fluctuations in the brain: Metastability and its dynamical cortical core. Scientific Reports, 
7(3095), 1-14. doi:10.1038/s41598-017-03073-5 
Dehaene, S. (2014). Consciousness and the brain: Deciphering how the brain codes our 
thoughts. New York, NY: Penguin. 
Diedrichsen, J. (2012). Motor coordination. Scholarpedia, 7(12): 12309. 
doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.12309  
Eliasmith, C. (1996). The third contender: A critical examination of the dynamicist theory of 
cognition. Philosophical Psychology, 9, 441-463. 
 41 
Eliasmith, C. (1997). Computation and dynamical models of mind. Minds and Machines, 7(4), 
531-541. 
Eliasmith, C. (2010). How we ought to describe computation in the brain. Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science Part A, 41(3), 313-320. 
Elman, J. L. (1991). Distributed representations, simple recurrent networks, and grammatical 
structure. Machine Learning, 7, 195-225. doi:10.1023/A:1022699029236 
Eyal, G., Verhoog, M. B., Testa-Silva, G., Deitcher, Y., Benavides-Piccione, R., DeFelipe, J., ... 
& Segev, I. (2018). Human cortical pyramidal neurons: From spines to spikes via models. 
Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience: Cellular Neurophysiology, 12(181), 1-24. 
doi:10.3389/fncel.2018.00181 
Fan, X., & Markram, H. (2019). A brief history of simulation neuroscience. Frontiers in 
Neuroinformatics, 13(32). doi:10.3389/fninf.2019.00032 
Favela, L. H. (2019). Integrated information theory as a complexity science approach to 
consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 26(1-2), 21-47. 
Favela, L. H. (2020). Dynamical systems theory in cognitive science and neuroscience. 
Philosophy Compass, 15(8), e12695, 1-16. doi:10.1111/phc3.12695 
Favela, L. H., & Martin, J. (2017). “Cognition” and dynamical cognitive science. Minds and 
Machines, 27, 331-355. doi:10.1007/s11023-016-9411-4 
Finney, D. J. (1977). Dimensions of statistics. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series C 
(Applied Statistics), 26(3), 285-289. 
FitzHugh, R. (1961). Impulses and physiological states in theoretical models of nerve membrane. 
Biophysical Journal, 1(6), 445-466. 
Fodor, J. A. (1975). The language of thought. New York, NY: Thomas Y. Crowell. 
 42 
Frégnac, Y. (2017). Big data and the industrialization of neuroscience: A safe roadmap for 
understanding the brain? Science, 358(6362), 470-477. 
Fuchs, A. (2013). Nonlinear dynamics in complex systems: Theory and applications for the life-, 
neuro-, and natural sciences. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
Gallego, J. A., Perich, M. G., Miller, L. E., & Solla, S. A. (2017). Neural manifolds for the 
control of movement. Neuron, 94(5), 978-984. 
Gerstner, W., Kistler, W. M., Naud, R., & Paninski, L. (2014). Neuronal dynamics: From single 
neurons to networks and models of cognition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Gervais, R. (2015). Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive 
science: Explanatory power, understanding, and the ‘mere description’ worry. Synthese, 
192(1), 43-66. 
Gibson, J. J. (1979/1986). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston, MA: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Golonka, S., & Wilson, A. D. (2019). Ecological mechanisms in cognitive science. Theory & 
Psychology, 29(5), 676-696. 
Guastello, S. J., Koopmans, M., & Pincus, D. (Eds.). (2011). Chaos and complexity in 
psychology: The theory of nonlinear dynamical systems. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Guckenheimer, J., & Holmes, P. (1983). Nonlinear oscillations, dynamical systems, and 
bifurcations of vector fields. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag. 
Haken, H., Kelso, J. A. S., & Bunz, H. (1985). A theoretical model of phase transitions in human 
hand movements. Biological Cybernetics, 51, 347-356. 
 43 
Heitmann, S., Boonstra, T., Gong, P., Breakspear, M., & Ermentrout, B. (2015). The rhythms of 
steady posture: Motor commands as spatially organized oscillation patterns. 
Neurocomputing, 170, 3-14. 
Hinton, G. E., & Salakhutdinov, R. R. (2006). Reducing the dimensionality of data with neural 
networks. Science, 313(5786), 504-507. 
Hodgkin, A. L., & Huxley, A. F. (1952). A quantitative description of membrane current and its 
application to conduction and excitation in nerve. The Journal of Physiology, 117(4), 
500-544. 
Holmes, S., & Huber, W. (2018). Modern statistics for modern biology. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Honey, C. J., & Sporns, O. (2008). Dynamical consequences of lesions in cortical networks. 
Human Brain Mapping, 29(7), 802-809. 
Izhikevich, E. (2007). Dynamical systems in neuroscience: The geometry of excitability and 
bursting. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Izhikevich, E. M., & FitzHugh, R. (2006). FitzHugh-Nagumo model. Scholarpedia, 1(9):1349. 
doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.1349 
Jolliffe, I. T., & Cadima, J. (2016). Principal component analysis: A review and recent 
developments. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, 
Physical and Engineering Sciences, 374(2065), 20150202. doi:10.1098/rsta.2015.0202 
Jonas, E., & Kording, K. P. (2017). Could a neuroscientist understand a microprocessor? PLoS 
Computational Biology, 13(1): e1005268. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005268 
 44 
Jordan, M. I., & Wolpert, D. M. (2000). Computational motor control. In M. S. Gazzaniga (Ed.), 
The new cognitive neurosciences (2nd ed.) (pp. 601-618). Cambridge, MA: The MIT 
Press. 
Kandel, E. R., Schwartz, J. H., & Jessell, T .M. (Eds.). (2000). Principles of neural science (4th 
ed.). McGraw-Hill. 
Kaplan, D. M., & Bechtel, W. (2011). Dynamical models: An alternative or complement to 
mechanistic explanations? Topics in Cognitive Science, 3(2), 438-444. 
Kass, R. E., Amari, S. I., Arai, K., Brown, E. N., Diekman, C. O., Diesmann, M., ... & Kramer, 
M. A. (2018). Computational neuroscience: Mathematical and statistical perspectives. 
Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application, 5, 183-214. 
Kelso, J. A. S. (2009). Coordination dynamics. In R. A. Meyers (Ed.), Encyclopedia of 
complexity and systems sciences (pp. 1537-1564). Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 
Kelso, J. A. S., & Haken, H. (1995). New laws to be expected in the organism: Synergetics of 
brain and behaviour. In M. Murphy & L. O'Neill (Eds.), What is life? The next fifty years: 
Speculations on the future of biology (pp. 137-160). Cambridge, MA: Cambridge 
University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511623295.012 
Koch, C. (1999). Biophysics of computation: Information processing in single neurons. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Koch, C., & Marcus, G. (2014). Cracking the brain’s codes. Technology Review, 117(4), 42-46. 
Krakauer, J. W., Ghilardi, M. F., & Ghez, C. (1999). Independent learning of internal models for 
kinematic and dynamic control of reaching. Nature Neuroscience, 2(11), 1026-1031. 
 45 
Krishnavedala. (2012). Geometrical diagram for the derivation of the height of a simple 
pendulum. Wikipedia. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Simple_pendulum_height.svg 
Krishnavedala. (2014). Pendulum phase portrait. Wikipedia. Retrieved from 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pendulum_phase_portrait.svg 
Latash, M. L., Levin, M. F., Scholz, J. P., & Schöner, G. (2010). Motor control theories and their 
applications. Medicina, 46(6), 382-392. doi:10.3390/medicina46060054 
Lebedev, M. A., Ossadtchi, A., Mill, N. A., Urpi, N. A., Cervera, M. R., & Nicolelis, M. A. 
(2019). Analysis of neuronal ensemble activity reveals the pitfalls and shortcomings of 
rotation dynamics. Scientific Reports, 9(18978), 1-14. doi:10.1038/s41598-019-54760-4 
Lins, J., & Schöner, G. (2014). A neural approach to cognition based on dynamic field theory. In 
S. Coombes, P. b. Graben, R. Potthast, & J. Wright (Eds), Neural fields: Theory and 
applications (pp. 319-339). New York, NY: Springer. 
Lyre, H. (2018). Structures, dynamics and mechanisms in neuroscience: An integrative account. 
Synthese, 195(12), 5141-5158. 
Meyer, R. (2018). The non-mechanistic option: Defending dynamical explanations. The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, axy034. doi:10.1093/bjps/axy034 
Michaels, J. A., Dann, B., & Scherberger, H. (2016). Neural population dynamics during 
reaching are better explained by a dynamical system than representational tuning. PLoS 
Computational Biology, 12(11): e1005175. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005175 
Nagumo, J., Arimoto, S., & Yoshizawa, S. (1962). An active pulse transmission line simulating 
nerve axon. Proceedings of the IRE, 50(10), 2061-2070. 
 46 
Nguyen, L. H., & Holmes, S. (2019). Ten quick tips for effective dimensionality reduction. PLoS 
Computational Biology, 15(6): e1006907. doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1006907 
Pitt, D. (2020). Mental representation. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (spring 2020 ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/mental-representation/ 
Port, R. F. (2006). Dynamical systems hypothesis in cognitive science. In L. Nadel (Ed.), 
Encyclopedia of cognitive science. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
doi:10.1002/0470018860.s00020 
Port, R. F., & van Gelder, T. (Eds.) (1995). Mind as motion: Explorations in the dynamics of 
cognition. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Prior, M. (2018, October 2). Scientists have built an artificial human brain cell. Frontiers Science 
News. Retrieved March 9, 2020 from https://blog.frontiersin.org/2018/10/02/cellular-
neuroscience-brain-neurons-memory/ 
Rabinovich, M. I., Varona, P., Selverston, A. I., & Abarbanel, H. D. (2006). Dynamical 
principles in neuroscience. Reviews of Modern Physics, 78(4), 1213-1265. 
Rescorla, M. (2020). The computational theory of mind. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford 
encyclopedia of philosophy (spring 2020 ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University. 
Retrieved from https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2020/entries/computational-mind/ 
Riley, M. A., & Holden, J. G. (2012). Dynamics of cognition. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: 
Cognitive Science, 3, 593-606. 
Ross, L. N. (2015). Dynamical models and explanation in neuroscience. Philosophy of Science, 
82(1), 32-54. 
 47 
Rumelhart, D. E. (1989). The architecture of mind: A connectionist approach. In M. Posner 
(Ed.), Foundations of cognitive science (pp. 133-159). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Sartori, M., Yavuz, U. Ş., & Farina, D. (2017). In vivo neuromechanics: Decoding causal motor 
neuron behavior with resulting musculoskeletal function. Scientific Reports, 7(13465), 1-
14. doi:10.1038/s41598-017-13766-6 
Schöner, G., Spencer, J. P., & the DFT Research Group. (2016). Dynamic thinking: A primer on 
dynamic field theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Shadmehr, R., & Krakauer, J. W. (2008). A computational neuroanatomy for motor control. 
Experimental Brain Research, 185(3), 359-381. 
Shapiro, L. A. (2013). Dynamics and cognition. Minds and Machines, 23, 353-375. 
Shapiro, L. (2019). Embodied cognition (2nd ed.). New York, NY: Routledge. 
Shenoy, K. V., Sahani, M., & Churchland, M. M. (2013). Cortical control of arm movements: A 
dynamical systems perspective. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 36, 337-359. doi: 
10.1146/annurev-neuro-062111-150509 
Sorzano, C. O. S., Vargas, J., & Pascual-Montano, A. (2014). A survey of dimensionality 
reduction techniques. arXiv. https://arxiv.org/abs/1403.2877 
Stillings, N. A., Weisler, S. E., Chase, C. H., Feinstein, M. H., Garfield, J. L., & Rissland, E. L. 
(1995). Cognitive science: An introduction (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: The MIT press. 
Strogatz, S. H. (2015). Nonlinear dynamics and chaos: With applications to physics, biology, 
chemistry, and engineering (2nd ed.). New York, NY: CRC Press. 
Sussillo, D. (2014). Neural circuits as computational dynamical systems. Current Opinion in 
Neurobiology, 25, 156-163. 
 48 
Thagard, P. (2005). Mind: Introduction to cognitive science (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
Thagard, P. (2019). Cognitive science. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of 
philosophy (spring 2019 ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University. Retrieved from 
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/cognitive-science/ 
Thelen, E., & Smith, L. B. (1994). A dynamic systems approach to the development of cognition 
and action. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Thompson, E. (2007). Mind in life: Biology, phenomenology, and the sciences of the mind. 
Cambridge MA: Belknap Press. 
Thomson, E., & Piccinini, G. (2018). Neural representations observed. Minds and Machines, 
28(1), 191-235. 
Turvey, M. T., & Fonesca, S. (2008). Nature of motor control: Perspectives and issues. In D. 
Sternad (Ed.), Progress in motor control (pp. 93-122). Boston, MA: Springer. 
van Gelder, T. (1995). What might cognition be, if not computation? The Journal of Philosophy, 
92(7), 345-381. 
van Gelder, T. (1998). The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 21(5), 615-628. 
van Gelder, T. (2006). Revising the dynamical hypothesis. In P. Farias, & J. Queiroz (Eds.), 
Advanced issues on cognitive science and semiotics (pp. 73-91). Aachen: Shaker Verlag. 
Varela, F. J., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and 
human experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Venturelli, A. N. (2016). A cautionary contribution to the philosophy of explanation in the 
cognitive neurosciences. Minds and Machines, 26(3), 259-285. 
 49 
Von Eckardt, B. (1995). What is cognitive science? Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Werner, S., Rink, J. C., Riedel-Kruse, I. H., & Friedrich, B. M. (2014). Shape mode analysis 
exposes movement patterns in biology: Flagella and flatworms as case studies. PLoS 
ONE, 9(11): e113083. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0113083 
Williamson, R. C., Doiron, B., Smith, M. A., & Byron, M. Y. (2019). Bridging large-scale 
neuronal recordings and large-scale network models using dimensionality reduction. 
Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 55, 40-47. 
Wilson, S., & Moore, C. (2015). S1 somatotopic maps. Scholarpedia, 10(4):8574. 
doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.8574 
Zednik, C. (2011). The nature of dynamical explanation. Philosophy of Science, 78(2), 238-263. 
Zednik, C. (2014). Are systems neuroscience explanations mechanistic? PhilSci Archive. 
http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/id/eprint/10859 
 
